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Lembre-se de Pearl Harbor

Lembre-se de Pearl Harbor


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    discurso pedindo uma declaração de guerra contra o Japão.
  • Como o plano do Japão para uma batalha naval decisiva com os Estados Unidos caiu nas mãos da Marinha.
  • Separando o mito da realidade sobre quem sabia o quê antes do ataque a Pearl Harbor.

Um avistamento de aviões não identificados por operadores de estação de radar minutos antes do ataque foi descartado por um oficial na sede do centro de comando, desperdiçando tempo que poderia ter sido usado para preparar defesas. De repente, aviões levando o sol vermelho surgiram e o bombardeio começou. Antes que o dia acabasse, 2.403 americanos estavam mortos e nossa Frota do Pacífico estava em ruínas.

Mesmo nesta época de crise, no entanto, os registros estavam sendo criados a bordo dos navios atracados em Pearl Harbor - registros que agora fazem parte dos arquivos do Arquivo Nacional. Estes são relatos em primeira mão dos diários de bordo dos navios e estações da Marinha dos EUA compilados de 1941 a 1978. E eles fornecem alguns insights sobre os eventos do dia - antes, durante e depois do ataque - através dos olhos daqueles que o testemunharam.

O dia - aquele que o presidente Franklin D. Roosevelt disse que "viveria na infâmia" - começou rotineiramente, como mostram as toras do convés. Para manter uma descrição precisa dos eventos à medida que aconteciam, o oficial designado colocava entradas no registro a cada quatro horas. Os intervalos são encontrados no início de cada entrada, conforme visto nos trechos abaixo. Por exemplo, antes da primeira entrada de cada navio, você verá o número 4–8 ou uma variação dele. Isso representa o período de tempo das 4h00 às 8h00.

Os registros do convés dos navios da Marinha são o "registro em execução" de todos os eventos que ocorrem a bordo de um navio da Marinha. As toras do convés eram e são mantidas por motivos jurídicos e administrativos. Geralmente, os registros do convés documentam os movimentos e encontros de um navio, juntamente com os acidentes, ferimentos, mortes, ações disciplinares e provisões de sua tripulação.

Além disso, os nomes dos membros da tripulação do navio também foram incluídos nos registros quando reunidos ou quando acusados ​​de um crime. A grande maioria dessas entradas documenta funções de rotina realizadas a bordo de um navio, mas as entradas em Pearl Harbor em 7 de dezembro de 1941 também capturam elementos do choque e da confusão provocados pelo ataque japonês.

No dia do ataque a Pearl Harbor, os registros começam com entradas de rotina, anotando o recebimento e inspeção das provisões. O USS Mastigar, USS Conyngham, USS Cummings, e USS Maryland estavam carregando provisões, principalmente sorvete, leite e gelo. A Chew recebeu 10 galões de leite e 4½ galões de sorvete a Conyngham recebeu 6 litros de sorvete o Cummings recebeu 15 galões de leite e 7 galões de sorvete e o Maryland recebeu 2.000 libras de gelo.

Por volta das 7h55, os membros da tripulação do Conyngham relatou um ataque de aviões japoneses e teve que realizar reparos de emergência nos motores principais. Às 8h08, os membros da tripulação abriram fogo contra os aviões japoneses, usando todas as suas metralhadoras. O registro do convés relata que eles abateram pelo menos três aviões inimigos. Um cessar-fogo foi relatado às 11h04, e entre meio-dia e 16h, membros da tripulação do Conyngham resgatou seus camaradas cujos navios foram destruídos, retirando mais de 30 pessoas das águas.

Embora fortemente danificado, o USS Maryland também foi ativo nos esforços de resgate. O navio foi capaz de resgatar 25 sobreviventes do USS Oklahoma, transferindo alguns para o USS Consolo. Enquanto isso, o USS Califórnia foi quase destruído e sua tripulação recebeu ordem de evacuar, pois a queima de óleo combustível na superfície da água ameaçava o navio. No entanto, a mancha de óleo em chamas limpou o navio e a tripulação voltou ao modo de batalha.

Entrada de registro para o USS Conyngham:

4–8
Amarrado como antes. 0630 Recebeu as seguintes disposições para uso em bagunça geral, inspecionado em [sic] quanto à quantidade pelo Lt (jg) JR HANSEN, USN., E quanto à qualidade por PARCHESKI, PC, PhMlc., Da Dairyman's Association Ltd .: sorvete— 6gals. 0755 Aviões japoneses começaram a bombardear a área de Pearl Harbor. Manteve quartéis gerais, equipou todas as armas, começou a espalhar a pólvora. Reparos de emergência iniciados nos motores principais para o início. Capitão na ponte.

[assinatura]
J.R. HANSEN
Tenente (jg), USN

8–12
Amarrado como antes. Às 0808 abriu fogo com canhões de 5 "(# 4 e # 5 no controle local) em aviões japoneses sobre a ilha de Ford e com todas as metralhadoras em aviões de ataque enquanto voavam baixo passando o ninho em direção ao norte das vizinhanças de Ford Island. Às 0813 O avião de ataque foi abatido por fogo combinado do ninho e caiu nas proximidades do CURTIS. Às 08h18 abriu fogo com canhões de 5 "(# 1 e # 2 no controle do diretor) contra bombardeiros horizontais que passavam no alto em direção ao Quartel Schofield. Às 08h25 abriram fogo com fwd 5 "e metralhadoras contra aviões metralhando ninho na direção de Pearl City. Às 08h26, aviões que cruzavam baixo à frente do ninho para NE foram pegos sob fogo, um explodiu em chamas e se espatifou em um grupo de árvores em Aiea Heights e explodiu . Às 8h30, o avião que mergulhou em direção à Ilha Ford vindo de NE foi abatido por um tiro combinado do ninho. Às 8h55 abriu fogo contra aviões bombardeando à frente e à ré. Às 0908, um avião que atacava a proa a estibordo foi abatido pelo ninho e caiu em direção ao quartel Schofield . Às 09h20, abriu fogo contra aviões que mergulhavam do lado do ninho a bombordo. 1045 REID arrancou e saiu do canal. 1100 abriu fogo com os canhões 1 e 2 em aviões que atacavam a bombordo. 1104 Cessaram os disparos. Tiros disparados. , 20 canhões # 2, 24 canhões # 4, 30 canhões # 5, 40 metralhadoras 2500 rodadas.

[assinatura]
J.R. HANSEN
Tenente (jg), USN

Entrada de registro para o USS Califórnia:

4 a 8: Ancorado como antes. 0621 YG-17 veio ao lado do porto. . . . [lista os homens que deixam o navio para patrulhar a costa]. . . 0750 aviões japoneses, sem avisar, atacaram unidades da Frota dos Estados Unidos e da Estação Aérea Naval dos EUA, Ilha de Ford. Quartéis Gerais sondados e Estações de Batalha tripuladas.

[assinatura]
NO. Nicholson, jr., Ensign, Marinha dos EUA.

O USS emborcado Oklahoma fica próximo a um USS Maryland ligeiramente danificado. (Registros de Comitês Conjuntos do Congresso, RG 128 ARC 306553)

8 a 12: Ancorado como antes, EUA OKLAHOMA atracado com motor de popa dos EUA MARYLAND, no cais F-4, foi atingido por três ou quatro torpedos. A Naval Air Station, Ford Island foi bombardeada. 0803 navios da Frota do Pacífico dos EUA abriram fogo contra aviões de ataque. Abriu fogo com 50 metralhadoras calibre # 1 e # 2 em um avião torpedeiro. 0805 atingido com um ou dois torpedos de bombordo no quadro 110. 0810 fez os preparativos para começar. Abriu fogo com canhões 5 "A.A. # 2 e # 4 em bombardeiros de mergulho. O navio começou a adernar para o porto. 0815 U.S.S. OKLAHOMA emborcou. O navio 0820 foi atingido no quadro 47 com um torpedo. 0825 abriu fogo com 5" A.A. bateria em bombardeiros horizontais. Navio sacudido por quatro ataques de bomba. A bomba 0830 atingiu o topo lado a lado com a casamata nº 1, quadro 59, penetrou no convés principal e explodiu no segundo convés, causando um grande incêndio. Navio listado 8 ° para bombordo, começou a contra-inundação de vazios de estibordo. 0845 O oficial executivo voltou a bordo e assumiu o vice-primeiro-tenente de comando. O Comandante Battle Force voltou a bordo. 0845 EUA VESTAL em andamento. 0847 U.S.S. MONOGHAM e NEOSHO em andamento. 0900 navio sacudido violentamente por causa indeterminada e seguiu-se uma grande emissão de fumaça do convés da galeria a estibordo. 0914 EUA NEVADA e FARRAGUT em andamento. 0905 capitão voltou a bordo. 0920 EUA PENSILVÂNIA bombardeada. 0922 U.S.S. NEVADA bombardeou e pegou fogo no meio do caminho. 0925 U.S.S. ALWYN e ST. LOUIS em andamento. 0925 U.S.S. O avião # 2-0-5 da CALIFÓRNIA capotou ao sair do navio. O incêndio das 0930 irrompeu no convés principal, lado de estibordo, compartimento da divisão "F" e casemates # 3, 5 e 7. Grande mancha de óleo combustível entre as 0930 dos berços F-3 e F-4 foi acesa e começou a derivar em direção ao navio. Avião abaixado 2-0-4 sobre o lado, avião taxiado para a Naval Air Station, Ensign S.M. Healy, U.S.N.R., piloto. EUA NEVADA engolfado por chamas nas proximidades do mastro de proa. 0945 EUA OGALA emborcou. 1002 O capitão, com a aprovação do Comandante da Força de Batalha, ordenou que o navio fosse temporariamente abandonado devido às chamas envolventes de fogo de óleo combustível na superfície da água. Após 1015 chamas de fogo sobre a água, a ordem de abandonar o navio foi cancelada e as estações de batalha do navio foram refeitas e o fogo a estibordo do convés principal e as casamatas lutaram. Ataque reiniciado por aeronaves inimigas. O navio começou a se acomodar com cerca de 10 ° de inclinação para o porto. Planta de engenharia protegida. O USYT NAKOMIS avançou pelo lado estibordo para ajudar no combate ao incêndio. O Comandante da Força de Batalha mudou a bandeira e o estado-maior para a Base Submarina, Pearl Harbor, T.H. A barcaça de óleo combustível da Navy Yard veio a bombordo para bombear os tanques de óleo combustível e tornar o navio mais leve. 1140 U.S.S. PHOENIX se destacou.

Entrada de registro para o USS Cummings:

4 a 8.
Amarrado como antes. 0400 Recebeu as seguintes provisões frescas para uso no General Mess: da Dairymen's Association, Ltd., 15 galões de leite, 7 galões de sorvete. Inspecionado quanto à quantidade pelo Lt. (jg) J.B. CARROLL, USN, e quanto à qualidade pelo R.G. VLIET, CPhM, USN. 0629 Protegido o relógio de segurança especial. 0630 Recebeu as seguintes provisões frescas para uso no General Mess: da Oahu Ice and Cold Storage Co., 300 libras de gelo. 0758 Air Raid. Aviões japoneses iniciaram um ataque de torpedo a navios de guerra em Pearl Harbor. Quarteirões gerais sondados.

[assinatura]
J.B. CARROLL
Tenente (jg), Marinha dos EUA.

8 a 12.
Amarrado como antes. Bateria de tripulantes no Quartel General. 0803 Depois que metralhadoras abriram fogo contra aviões de torpedo japoneses. 0808 Fogo aberto em bombardeiros horizontais com bateria principal. 0810 Iniciou os preparativos para o início de acordo com o sinal voando na torre de sinalização. 0811 Abriu fogo contra bombardeiros de mergulho com bateria principal. 0820 Calmaria no ataque aéreo. Cessou o fogo. 0840 Abriu fogo para repelir o ataque de straffing. 0842 Após o disparo de metralhadoras atrás de metralhadoras, o bombardeiro planador foi observado se afastando do navio com fumaça saindo dele, passando pela oficina de planejamento e desaparecendo em uma nuvem de fumaça emitida pela Doca Seca # 1. 0900 Avistou doze aviões espalhados sobre a Ilha Ford. 0903 Ataque aéreo retomado. Fogo aberto com bateria principal. 0910 Bombardeiros de mergulho atacaram navios no Píer 19, bombas caíram na água perto do navio, à frente e à ré, a 25 jardas do navio. Como resultado dos fragmentos da bomba, ocorreram três baixas, as duas primeiras foram subsequentemente transferidas para o Hospital Naval, Pearl Harbor, para tratamento posterior, após o tratamento de primeiros socorros por R.G. VLIET, CPhM, USN: GROUND, Orla L., 372 12 45 f3c, USN, sofreu um ferimento, esquerda inferior esquerda # 2576, condição não grave MOORE, Grover C., Jr. 256 33 15, Seal, USN, sofreu um ferida lacerada na região escapular esquerda # 2563, condição não grave Smith, Fred A., 310 84 65, GMlc, USN, sofreu um ferimento superficial na coxa direita # 2576, condição favorável. Comandante L.P. LOVETTE, USN. O Comandante Destroyer Divisão CINCO reportou a bordo ao Comandante Destroyer Esquadrão TRÊS para serviço temporário, o CASSIN, nau capitânia, Destroyer Divisão CINCO tendo sido destruído em doca seca por bombardeio. 0920 Um avião de combate Karigane foi observado quebrando em uma fumaça densa ao virar na direção de West Loch. 1000 Abriu fogo para repelir o ataque de bombardeiro horizontal vindo do sul. 1002 Tiroteio da bateria principal derrubou a asa do bombardeiro horizontal. 1015. . . oficiais dos EUA Case, incapaz de retornar à sua própria nave, apresentou-se a bordo ao Comandante Destroyer Esquadrão TRÊS para tarefas temporárias. SHED, J.W., CRM (AA), USN relatou a bordo para serviço temporário dos EUA PREBLE. 1040 Em andamento de acordo com a surtida de direção de sinal geral e ordens verbais do Esquadrão Comandante Destruidor TRÊS, saindo do porto em vários cursos em várias velocidades nas caldeiras # 1 e # 2 Capitão no Navegador na ponte. Velocidade padrão 15 nós. 1102 Passou pela bóia # 1 do canal uma viga para estibordo e começou a observar as Regras Internacionais de Estrada. 1120 A velocidade alterada para 10 nós mudou o curso para 200 ° T, distante cerca de 1.700 jardas. Manobrou para atacar. 1127 Caiu três cargas de profundidade. Manobrou para chegar em segundo.

Os registros também documentaram a confusão causada pelo ataque surpresa, registrando relatórios falsos e investigações tensas de navios não identificados e contatos de sonar. O USS Maryland recebeu relatos errôneos de que um grupo de soldados japoneses havia saltado de paraquedas na Estação Aérea Naval de Barbers Point e na costa norte da ilha de Oahu. Neste registro, a tripulação até deu descrições do grupo misterioso, descrevendo-os como vestindo macacões azuis com emblemas vermelhos.

Muitos dos registros continham relatos detalhados dos danos causados ​​pelo ataque. No ataque de duas horas, a Frota do Pacífico dos EUA foi deixada quase em ruínas, com 8 navios de guerra, 3 cruzadores e 188 aviões destruídos. O log do USS Medusa observa que o USS Utah estabeleceu-se a bombordo após ser atacado. Também relatou navios que foram atingidos por torpedos aéreos e afundaram. Muitos também relataram seu próprio sucesso, incluindo o USS Dale, que registrou com destaque que o navio foi capaz de abater uma aeronave inimiga. o Maryland relataram membros da tripulação realizando vários esforços de mergulho para consertar peças danificadas para salvar o navio.

Entrada de registro para o USS Maryland:

04–08
Amarrado como antes. 0640 Recebido a bordo da Oahu Ice and Cold Storage Co., de Honolulu, T.H. 2.000 libras. de gelo para uso em caixas de gelo de navios. 0750 aviões japoneses começaram a bombardear o pátio. Bombardeiros de mergulho. 0752 Quarteirões gerais sondados. EUA OKLAHOMA atingido por um número desconhecido de torpedos. O controle mudou para a torre de comando.

[assinatura]
J. B. Thro
Alferes, Marinha dos EUA

Resgatando sobreviventes perto do USS West Virginia após o ataque a Pearl Harbor, 7 de dezembro de 1941. (80-G-19930)

Amarrado como antes. O oficial comandante devolveu o tenente (jg) Nelson H. Randall, C-V (S), USNR e o alferes James A. Parks, Jr., D-V (g), USNR. Comecei a ganhar força e a fazer todos os preparativos para o início. 0805 Abriu fogo com a bateria de 1,1 ", a bateria da metralhadora calibre 50 e a bateria do calibre 5" / 25, abriram fogo nessa ordem pouco antes. 0810 EUA OKLAHOMA ao lado de bombordo tombado para bombordo até ficar a estibordo com a quilha aparecendo. 0815 Conning Tower assumiu a direção e o controle do motor. 0838 Aprovado por todas as linhas. 0839 Todas as caixas prontas reabastecidas durante a calmaria. 0840 Recebido relatório de que um submarino inimigo estava dentro de Pearl Harbor. 0848 EUA NEOSHO em andamento do píer de óleo combustível diretamente à frente deste navio. Vários destróieres parados fora do porto. 0855 Começou a atirar com bateria de calibre 5 "/ 25. 0857 USS NEVADA em andamento, USS OGALA em andamento. 0858 USS WEST VIRGINIA assentando, fogo apareceu no ou próximo ao USS TENNESSEE. 0859 USS CALIFORNIA listado no porto. 0900 Fogo aberto com baterias AA restantes. . 0909 Recebeu um e possivelmente dois ataques de bomba no castelo de proa na linha de meia nau sobre o quadro 10, relatório detalhado de danos a ser dado mais tarde, e cerca de três quase acidentes em cada lado e à frente da proa. 0914 Torpedo compressor de ar relatado fora de serviço, perdido pressão de ar na porta 5 "/ bateria calibre 25. Avião inimigo em chamas caiu nos EUA CURTIS. 0925 Tiro recomendado. 0928 Fogo leve no castelo de proa e saída da ponte de sinal. Relatório recebido de que o contra-almirante W. S. Anderson subiu a bordo às 0905. 0930 Lull no ataque. 0936 EUA PHELPS se destacando. Submarinos japoneses relatados dentro e fora de Pearl Harbor. 0940 EUA WEST VIRGINIA abandonando o navio. 50 revistas de calibre inundadas. 0943 Torre três (3) coberta com chamas de óleo queimando na água. 0945 Recebido relatório de aviões inimigos concentrando-se ao sul de Pearl Harbor. 0947 Recebido de CincPac, todos os navios de guerra permanecem em Pearl até novas ordens, canal provavelmente minado. 0949 Bombardeiros de patrulha Catalina decolando. 0950 U.S.S. OGALA afundou ao lado da doca 1010. 0955 Fogo sob controle no tombadilho. 1005 U.S.S. SOLACE em andamento, EUA SHAW em doca seca flutuante envolta em chamas. 1009 Começou a atirar em aeronaves inimigas. 1012 começou a bombear em troncos dianteiros. 1022 afundamento de doca seca flutuante, explosões nos EUA SHAW. 1029 Relatório de vítimas, um (1) oficial morto, 1 um soldado morto, um (1) soldado ferido. 1025 tropas de pára-quedas relataram perto de Barbers Point. 1034 Submarine relatou 10 milhas ao sul de Barbers Point. 1039 U.S.S. CUMMINGS em andamento. 1040 Explosão nos EUA WEST VIRGINIA. 1044 U.S.S. Liquidação da CALIFÓRNIA. 1051 Submarino inimigo avistado pelos EUA CONSOLO. 1055 Começou a atirar em aeronaves inimigas vindo de bombordo. 1100 Inimigo relatou aproximar-se de Pearl vindo do sul. 1150 disparos iniciados. 1104 U.S.S. PHOENIX se destacando. 1105 Cruiser e Destroyer se destacando. 1106 450 tiros de 5 "/ 25 calibre gastos até este momento. 1107 Começou a atirar em aviões inimigos no feixe de estibordo. 1112 Navio-tanque inimigo relatado para o sul. 1114 Começou a atirar em aviões inimigos. 1119 fogo de óleo na água ao redor do USS WEST VIRGINIA piorando , aproximando-se da popa deste navio. 1124 Abriu fogo no avião no quartel do porto. 1127 Oito navios inimigos relatados na latitude 21 ° 10 'N, Longitude 160 ° 16' oeste. 1127 Começou a atirar contra aviões inimigos, despendeu 15 tiros 5 "/ 25 calibre. 1137 tropas de pára-quedas relataram aterrissagem em North Shore. 1143 Relatório recebeu tropas inimigas vestindo macacões azuis com emblemas vermelhos. 1145 Retirou o fogo e a equipe de resgate para ajudar no resgate dos EUA Pessoal da OKLAHOMA.

[assinatura]
H. W. Hadley
Lieut-Comdr., Marinha dos EUA

12–16
Ancorados como antes, 1201 tropas de pára-quedas relataram aterrissagem em Barbers Point e os tanques inimigos relataram quatro (4) milhas fora de Wainae. 1204 Chamas de óleo de fogo avançando ao longo do lado de bombordo. 1229 Aviões inimigos avistados no feixe de bombordo, submarinos inimigos relatados ao sul de Pearl. 1327 Enviou 400 cartuchos de munição calibre 5 "/ 25 para o USS CALIFORNIA. 1350 Fogo de óleo na popa do USS TENNESSEE. 1355 Começou a atirar em aviões inimigos. 1400 Nenhuma mudança de calado de navios nas últimas quatro (4) horas, 7 pés para baixo pela proa, 3½ ° tombado para estibordo. 1428 Caldeiras seguras # 5-6-7 e 8. 1441 USS CALIFORNIA relatou acordo com tombamento para bombordo, USS HELENA descendo pela proa. 1445 USS BOGGS parado. 1446 Recebeu 15.000 cartuchos de munição de 50 calibre do oeste Bloqueio. 1458 USS DEWEY destacado. Bombeamento em troncos dianteiros sem progresso. 1501 Aviões reportados acima, muito alto. 1508 USS CURTIS reportado avistamento de submarino. 1525 USS BEHAM lançando cargas de profundidade no canal norte. 1523 Dois aviões não identificados avistados no feixe de estibordo. 1529 Avião não identificado avistado a estibordo. 1538 Três bombardeiros da marinha pousaram em Ford Island e Hickman Field. 1551 Minas relatadas entre Diamond Head e Barbors Point. 1553 Dois (2) navios de guerra e muitos destróieres relatados avistados em Latit ude 21 ° 21 'longitude 158 ° 37'.

[assinatura]
H. W. Hadley
Lieut-Comdr., Marinha dos EUA

Entrada de registro para o USS Dale:

04–08
Amarrado como antes. 0758 Ondas de aviões torpedeiros, bombardeiros de nível e bombardeiros de mergulho marcados com insígnias japonesas atacaram Pearl Harbor. Sondagem geral dos quartos estabelecidos condição afirmam acender as caldeiras # 1 e # 2 e # 4. Tirando munição.

[assinatura]
F.M. Radel
Alferes, Marinha dos EUA

08–12
Amarrado como antes. 0810 abriu fogo contra aviões com metralhadoras seguidas da bateria principal. 0815 Um avião inimigo considerado abatido por uma metralhadora do USS DALE. 0825 Caldeiras # 1, # 2 e # 4 ativadas na linha principal. 0836 Em andamento em vários cursos e em várias velocidades saindo de Pearl Harbor. Ensign F.M. Radel, U.S.N. Oficial Comandante, seguintes oficiais nomeados e homens ausentes: - Tenente Comandante. A.L. Rorschach, U.S.N. Lt. R.L. Moore, Jr., U.S.N. Ensign K.G. Robinson, U.S.N. Ensign D.J. Vellis U.S.N., Ensign L.C. Huntley, U.S.N.R. Ensign M.D. Callahan U.S.N.R. EDWARDS, G.L. CMM U.S.N. WARREN, R.H. F.C.lc U.S.N. COULSON, S.E.M. 2c, U.S.N. SMITH, J.V. Sea lc. U.S.N.FALCONER, D.D. Ylc., U.S.S.N. NEHRING, R.A. F.C. 3c, U.S.N. GAWBILL, M. M.M.lc, U.S.N. INGLÊS, J.F. M.M.lc, U.S.N. JENNINGS, A.V. F.2c, U.S.N. 0844 Parou enquanto o USS MONAGHAN lançava duas cargas de profundidade no que se pensava ser um submarino inimigo próximo ao USS CURTIS. 0848 Velocidade alterada para 25 nós saindo do canal. 0907 A bóia de entrada nº 1 de Pearl Harbor passou de águas interiores para águas internacionais. 0909 Estabelecida a patrulha offshore no setor # 1 em vários cursos e em várias velocidades, manobrando para evitar bombardeios e metralhadoras. 0911 Abateu um bombardeiro de mergulho inimigo com tiros de metralhadora calibre .50. 0959 Pequeno barco investigado carregando uma pequena bandeira branca com vários passageiros orientais. 1114 Juntou-se a USS WORDEN (CDS-1) no curso 340 ° T, 328 ° psc, velocidade de 11 nós. 1149 Coluna formada, ordem dos navios na coluna WORDEN, ALWYN, DALE E FARRAGUT: no curso 271 ° T, 260 ° psc, velocidade de 25 nós.

[assinatura]
F.M. Radel
Alferes, Marinha dos EUA

12–16
No vapor como antes. 1200 Rumo alterado para a esquerda para 076 ° T, para fechar o USS DETROIT. 1205 Estabilizado no curso 076 ° T 065 ° psc, velocidade de 27 nós. 1228 Tela anti-submarino interna formada em três cruzadores leves. DALE na estação nove, curso 245 ° T 065 ° psc, velocidade de 20 nós. Plano zig zagging # 2 iniciado. 1238 USS FARRAGUT deixou a formação para investigar o desembarque relatado do inimigo na praia de Nanakuli. 1244 USS FARRAGUT voltou à formação. . . . [série de mudanças de curso]. . . 1345 Fogo aberto em aviões de nacionalidade indeterminada. 1346 Cessou o fogo. 1351 Velocidade da frota alterada para 25 nós. 1410 Rolamentos do pinhão L.P. queimados na engrenagem de redução de bombordo prosseguindo na velocidade do motor de estibordo de 22 nós. 1440 Velocidade alterada para 10 nós - velocidade máxima disponível de cerca de 15 nós. 1458 Velocidade alterada para 15 nós, velocidade da frota de 20 nós. DALE deixando a formação de popa. 1503 Avião de patrulha avistado rumo a 150 ° T. Vapor médio 400, rpm médio 156,1

[assinatura]
F.M. Radel
Alferes, Marinha dos EUA

O almirante Chester W. Nimitz pregou a cruz da Marinha em Doris Miller em uma cerimônia em Pearl Harbor, em 27 de maio de 1942. (208-NP-8PP-2)

Uma coisa que falta nos registros são os muitos atos de heroísmo que refletem o espírito de patriotismo entre quase todos os que serviram ao exército durante esse período. Um exemplo seguro de heroísmo ausente dos registros é o da cozinheira Doris "Dorie" Miller, de terceira classe, designada para o USS West Virginia. Como muitos dos afro-americanos que ingressaram na Marinha, Miller ocupou uma posição em que nunca se envolveria em uma situação de combate.

No entanto, durante o ataque, Miller se tornou mais do que apenas um cozinheiro. Depois de resgatar o capitão mortalmente ferido de seu navio, Miller pilotou uma metralhadora antiaérea Browning calibre 50. Miller atirou nos aviões japoneses até que recebeu ordem de abandonar o navio. O inexperiente Miller abateu entre quatro e seis aviões japoneses. Por seus esforços, Miller foi condecorado com a Cruz da Marinha, tornando-se o primeiro afro-americano a receber essa menção. O almirante Chester W. Nimitz, o comandante-chefe da Frota do Pacífico, apresentou pessoalmente o prêmio a ele.

Após o ataque devastador, o Congresso declarou guerra ao Japão, trazendo oficialmente os Estados Unidos para a Segunda Guerra Mundial. Todos os navios de guerra de Pearl Harbor, exceto três, o USS Arizona, o USS Oklahoma, e o USS Utah, foram levantados, reconstruídos e colocados de volta ao serviço durante a guerra.

Entrada de registro do USS Mastigar:

4 a 8.
Amarrado como antes. Recebeu as seguintes provisões para a bagunça geral inspecionada quanto à quantidade e qualidade por Ensign W.H. HARTZ, Jr .: da Dairyman's Association Ltd., 10 galões. leite, 4½ galões. sorvete. 0757 Sofreu ataque aéreo surpresa por torpedos japoneses e aviões de bombardeio. Quartéis Gerais sondados e bateria antiaérea tripulada. Bombardeiros japoneses leves e pesados ​​cruzaram Pearl Harbor em alta altitude, marcando acertos diretos em várias unidades da frota.

[assinatura]
W.H. Hartz Jr., Alferes, USNR.

8 a 12.
Atracado como antes no General Quarters. 0803 Tiro iniciado. 0811 Ataque contínuo de bombardeiros japoneses e bombardeiros de mergulho. A arma AA de três polegadas acertou em cheio um bombardeiro de mergulho, demolindo o avião no ar. Golpe observado pelo oficial executivo e vários membros da tripulação. Dois outros acertos prováveis ​​marcados, um na montagem da cauda do bombardeiro de mergulho. Parecia haver três ondas de aviões de ataque - aviões-torpedo, bombardeiros de alta altitude, bombardeiros de mergulho. Fiz todos os preparativos para seguir em frente. 0814 Corte a caldeira nº 2 na linha de vapor principal. 0934 O ataque de bombardeio cessou. 1000 A caminho para a área marítima defensiva em vários cursos a várias velocidades. Capitão comandando o navegador na ponte, desmagnetizando as bobinas, tripulação no Quartel General. 1020 Bóias de entrada ultrapassadas conduzindo a busca por submarinos inimigos. 1030 Estabeleceu contato supersônico, 1000 jardas a oeste das bóias de entrada: ataque iniciado, lançado uma carga de profundidade. Nenhuma explosão ouvida. 1052 Lançado quatro cargas de profundidade três explosões ouvidas. 1100 Tripulação reunida na estação. Seguindo oficiais e homens ausentes por circunstâncias além de seu controle: Tenente. (jg) C.F. MacNISH, USNR, Alferes J.F. MORRISON, USNR. . .

1114 Lancha a motor MINNEAPOLIS recebida ao lado e os seguintes oficiais e homens subiram a bordo:. . . [outra lista de nomes, inclui os navios de onde vieram, por exemplo USS Alwyn, USS Dale] . . 1142 fez contato supersônico na metade oeste da área marítima defensiva. Lançou duas cargas de profundidade. Vapor médio 250 rpm médio 126,6.

[assinatura]
W.H. Hartz Jr., Alferes, USNR.

12 a 16.
Patrulhando como antes. 1214 Estabeleceu contato supersônico na área marítima defensiva. Caiu duas cargas de profundidade, uma explosão ouvida. 1243 Aliviado USS WARD do serviço de patrulha na área marítima defensiva. 1515 Fez contato supersônico na área de defesa do mar a oeste das bóias de entrada. Caiu quatro cargas de profundidade, duas explosões ouvidas. Vapor médio 250 rpm médio 74,1.

[assinatura]
W.H. Hartz Jr., Alferes, USNR.

16 a 20.
Patrulhando como antes em condição de prontidão 2. 1630 Os seguintes oficiais e homens relataram a bordo:. . . 1845 Sounded General Quarters. 1905 garantido do quartel-general. "

Com o tempo, velhas feridas cicatrizam e as memórias desaparecem, deixando eventos importantes reduzidos a um ponto na linha do tempo. O ataque a Pearl Harbor foi um daqueles raros eventos estimulantes que uniram a nação em uma única causa. Esse episódio não se repetiu na história americana até os ataques terroristas de 11 de setembro de 2001.

Por meio dessas entradas retiradas de toras de convés - criadas como documentos administrativos de rotina - os leitores modernos podem ter uma noção do choque, surpresa e confusão sentidos pelos soldados e marinheiros que experimentaram este momento crucial na história americana em primeira mão.

Os autores, membros da Divisão de Gestão de Holdings, fizeram parte da equipe que processou os registros do convés da Marinha, 1941–1979, entre outubro de 2009 e outubro de 2010 nos Arquivos Nacionais em College Park.

Lopez D. Matthews, Jr., ingressou no National Archives and Records Administration em 2009. Ele recebeu seu diploma de bacharel em história pela Coppin State University em 2004, um mestrado em história pública em 2006 e seu doutorado. em história dos EUA pela Howard University em 2009.

Zachary Dabbs ingressou no National Archives and Records Administration em 2009. Ele se formou em história pela University of Wisconsin – Madison em 2007 e fez mestrado no programa de gerenciamento de arquivos da New York University em 2009.

Eliza Mbughuni ingressou no National Archives and Records Administration em 2008 como estudante, enquanto fazia mestrado na University of Maryland College, College Park. Ela recebeu o diploma de bacharel em história pela University of Wisconsin – Madison em 2004.

Nota sobre fontes

Os registros do convés dos navios em Pearl Harbor em 7 de dezembro de 1941 fazem parte dos Registros do Bureau of Naval Personnel, Record Group 24. Os registros estão localizados na National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) em College Park, Maryland, no ramo militar moderno. Os logs incluídos neste artigo eram dos seguintes navios: USS Mastigar (DD-106), USS Conyngham (DD-371), USS Cummings (DD-365), USS Dale (DD-353), USS Maryland (BB-46), USS Medusa (AR-1) e USS Califórnia (BB-44).

Todo esforço foi feito para produzir uma transcrição fiel, mantendo a capitalização, a pontuação e a estrutura geral do documento. No entanto, para preservar o espaço e melhorar a legibilidade, os autores corrigiram silenciosamente os erros de grafia e omitiram longas descrições técnicas e longas listas de nomes.

Além dos registros do convés, os autores consultaram Alan Brinkley, The Unfinished Nation: A Concise History of the American People, 6ª ed. (Nova York: McGraw-Hill, 2009) Lawrence Dunbar Reddick, "O Negro na Marinha dos Estados Unidos durante a Segunda Guerra Mundial", Journal of Negro History 32 (abril de 1947): 204 e o site do Comando de História e Patrimônio Naval (www.history.navy.mil).

Esta página foi revisada pela última vez em 10 de agosto de 2020.
Contate-nos com perguntas ou comentários.


Como lembrar o dia de Pearl Harbor

O encouraçado USS Arizona queimadas após o ataque japonês a Pearl Harbor, em 7 de dezembro de 1941. (Marinha dos EUA / Comando de História e Patrimônio da Marinha dos EUA / Folheto via Reuters)

S até o nono aniversários de qualquer evento raramente merecem cobertura de primeira página. A memória se desvanece, sobreviventes e testemunhas deixam a cena e novos dias de lembrança são instaurados. Cubra-o novamente nos grandes aniversários de números redondos & # 8212, talvez no próximo ano.

O mesmo aconteceu com o 79º aniversário do ataque japonês a Pearl Harbor, que trouxe os EUA para a Segunda Guerra Mundial. Não é mais um elemento fixo no calendário emocional, cívico e político. Por décadas, na década de 1990, era raro pegar um jornal em 7 de dezembro e não ver o icônico USS Arizona em chamas e afundando na primeira página. Já não.

Ironicamente, mais ou menos na época em que 7 de dezembro começou a escorregar da memória e observação cívica ativa, o Congresso o introduziu na lei como um dia oficial de lembrança em 1994.

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Um livro para nossos Vezes: Peter Wood & # 8217s 1620 Projeto Skewers 1619

Cuidado: os novos mandatos do Civics serão acordados

Pais acusam a High School de usar o artigo George Floyd do Washington Post para doutrinar alunos

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Uma sociedade mole e mimada, & ampc.

Durante as primeiras quatro décadas após o evento, foi difícil lembrar um Dia de Pearl Harbor que não tenha começado com pensamentos ou lições do ataque. Minha professora da quinta série, Sra. Brantley, nos contou em 7 de dezembro sobre ser uma garotinha em Pearl e deitada sob a mesa da cozinha em sua casa nas colinas acima do porto & # 8212 vendo os rostos de pilotos japoneses através das janelas como eles correram em suas corridas de bombardeio apenas algumas centenas de metros acima da casa.

Temos 11 de setembro agora e # 8212 um dia cru e contemporâneo de tragédia nacional para observar. A geração da Segunda Guerra Mundial está passando, e nossa cultura cívica, tal como está, concentra-se em diferentes questões.

O Dia de Pearl Harbor ainda merece uma reflexão séria, e não apenas para lamentar a perda das 2.403 almas mortas naquele dia, ou para saudar a coragem daqueles que perseveraram e lutaram durante o ataque. Além disso, nosso refrão constante e anual no Dia de Pearl Harbor deve ser nos lembrar que ataques surpresa são uma característica endêmica da segurança nacional, e isso continuará a acontecer aos EUA repetidamente se não adotarmos uma postura e um conjunto de políticas que mitigar os piores efeitos desses ataques.

Para um historiador militar, a única característica surpreendente dos ataques surpresa é que qualquer pessoa fica surpreso com sua frequência. Quase todos os grandes eventos da Segunda Guerra Mundial antes de Pearl Harbor foram uma surpresa de alguma forma: considere a incursão japonesa na Manchúria, as invasões de Hitler na Polônia, França, Bálcãs e Rússia, a destruição britânica da frota mediterrânea italiana em Taranto e muito mais.

After Pearl, the Japanese continued to surprise elsewhere in the Asia-Pacific theater — sometimes by surprise tactics and methods, as in their previously unimaginable landward-side invasion of the British redoubt at Singapore.

The allies swung quickly into the surprise-attack line of work, effectively shocking the Axis with the landings in North Africa almost a year after Pearl Harbor, and then again in Sicily and on mainland Italy in 1943. Remarkably, after knowing the cross-channel invasion blow would fall in northeast France, the Germans were still caught off guard by the Normandy landings on D-Day. The Americans were surprised in return by the German offensive a few months later in the Battle of the Bulge.

The pattern was ever thus and continues so. The U.S. was surprised in the Korean War (twice) and surprised the North Koreans in return with the landings at Inchon. The Tet offensive surprised us in Vietnam. Israel seemed to have perfected strategically decisive surprise attacks with the Six-Day War of 1967 but was surprised in return during the Yom Kippur War six years later.

I was an Army lieutenant patrolling the border between West Germany and Czechoslovakia in November 1989, when we witnessed the slow-motion surprise of the Iron Curtain collapse. A year later, I was in Saudi Arabia preparing to invade Iraq because Saddam Hussein had surprised the world with his invasion of Kuwait. Our cavalry regiment surprised the Iraqi Republican Guard by coming out of an unexpected corner of the desert — despite their forces’ being prepared and awaiting our advance for weeks.

A surprise attack on the homeland and civilians is a different order of surprise attack, of course. Before we let it fade into the history books and out of civic practice, Pearl Harbor Day is a chance to formally reflect on this phenomenon of surprise and what can be done about it.

First, we must consciously autocorrect our inclination (especially Americans) to think that if we are done with surprise attacks then they must be done with us. As Michael Howard’s brilliant treatise War and the Liberal Conscience shows, liberal societies such as ours want to believe that the last attack or the last war was . . . just that. The liberal mind (in the classic, not political definition) believes, with a kind of innocent hubris, that peace and commerce are the natural conditions of mankind. The world is flat countries with McDonald’s don’t invade one another power politics and surprise attacks are a thing of our barbaric past. Until they are not.

Warnings, even of the most prescient sort, do not work against this mindset. In 1999, I served as a scholar on a bipartisan blue-ribbon commission that issued a report on the likely nature of future security challenges. Our first point in a lengthy analysis was stated thus: “The greatest threat to the United States in the future is the use of catastrophic terrorism against our homeland and our military superiority will not protect us.” The effort garnered maybe 50 short mentions in the national media in the summer of 1999. In contrast, that summer there were over 500 stories about shark attacks at American beaches. This was, after all, the height of post–Cold War peace and the go-go economic years. Nobody had time for a bunch of national-security Cassandras at the Dow 36,000 party.

Second, we must realize that preventing surprise attacks is not a matter of addressing “intelligence failures.” There are always intelligence failures, process issues, and human failings (they were legion at Pearl Harbor) that are culprits in such an attack. To our credit, we investigate and correct them with rigor. But that does not prevent the next one. The bomber will always get through, Stanley Baldwin reminded us.

Intelligence work and even good predictive analysis are important, no doubt. But far too often this fails to detect or help arrest the next surprise. As Lawrence Freedman pointed out in his recent book, The Future of War: A History, we have a miserable track record of predicting the next conflict. But it always comes. And it is different from what we thought.

Finally, and most importantly, as a matter of policy we must recognize that the only effective mitigation against being disastrously surprised as we were on December 7, 1941, or September 11, 2001, is to be the surpriser e não o surprisee. Not in the literal sense exactly, but rather in terms of America’s overall strategy and strategic posture.

That posture should be one oriented on the initiative of action (both diplomatic and military), on shaping events with constant activity and ideas, on being positioned forward, of being intellectually if not strategically on the offensive. This is not a call for invasions everywhere, but rather a strategic state of mind. A great power must be on the front foot, not the back. As a rule, for great powers, a passive posture invites attacks.

We are not in that forward-leaning frame of mind right now. Both presidential candidates had a dovish attitude toward American military deployments and commitments, using similar language about deployments and missions abroad. One would end the “forever wars” and the other would conclude the “endless wars.”

This is not a strategy, but rather a sentiment. One that has stayed with us from the time of the draftee military — a World War II sentiment, if you will — and the times when we mobilized on all levels nationally to fight big wars, including the Cold War. But we now have a very small and professional all-volunteer force. Nobody needs to go back to the farm or the factory to get the economy moving and return to normal.

The troops I spent time with over the past few years in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Southern Philippines, and elsewhere are triple volunteers in some ways for these deployments. They like to play “away games,” so to speak. Their work is done in these places — they exercise their craft and their profession there. They are not seeking to end these deployments if the national-security interest calls for keeping some pattern of them going. Great powers do not have walls, oceans, allies, international organizations, or NGOs behind which to retreat.

Over the past dozen years, our leaders have done a poor job preparing the American public to understand that phenomenon and the relatively low cost of having a high impact/low footprint set of deployments around the world — and sometimes the need for high impact/high footprint deployment.

An offensive posture in the world, even principally diplomatic in nature, is the best tonic against tragic surprises. And then, when we are surprised (and we will be), robust resiliency on the back end. We have much work to do as a nation — especially in the areas of cyber and infrastructure vulnerability.

How best to honor the memory of the fallen at Pearl Harbor 79 years ago today? By reducing the chances of future Pearl Harbors and 9/11’s through being prepared intellectually, culturally, and strategically.


More Comments:

Dominic W. Moreo - 9/13/2002

Intern, indeed. If dealing with a morning paper like the NYT, one must consult the following day, say, December 8, 1942, to find out what happened on December 7th. But today growing up in instant 24/7 cycles, it is difficult to understand the snail like pace of the press.
So FDR attributed the "arsenal of democracy" to John Milton late of the 17th Century! And our intern bought it! But FDR got it from . who got it from. the originator. Check it out.

Yumitsu Takaishi - 9/13/2002

I understand that America has to fight against terrorizm in order to protect America itself.I also agree with your hostility to terrorists,but do not acccept your behavior in Afganistan.
Japanese army attacked Pearl Harver in December 1941.That hurt the pride of American nations."Remember Pearl Harver."has chenged to"Remember 9.11." you are going to do the same thing you had done in world war 2. You must not forget you had burned eighty thousand citizen people to death only through two hours bombing attack at Tokyo by 240 B29 on March 10 1945.Do you repeat that tragedy again? Do you want to make your country insane by bearing huge number of murders in your own country?
Do you believe that America is quarified to blame Iraq, North Corea and Iran for their dangerouseness? As far as I am concerned,America can not solve the troubles we are fronting now by uaing military power. It surely will make another troubles one after another. Don't you think you should choose another cleverer way to be respected by aii over the world?


Remember 9/11, Forget Pearl Harbor?

Emily S. Rosenberg is professor of history at the University of California, Irvine, past president of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations, and author of "A Date Which Will Live: Pearl Harbor in American Memory" (Durham: Duke University Press, 2003). This article is cross-posted from a roundtable on SHAFR's blog.

Is 12/7 or 9/11 the date that lives in infamy? The possibility that popular historical memories of the attack of 9/11 may be crowding out those of the Japan’s 1941 attack, making 9/11 the central infamous episode in recent U.S. history, raises larger questions about how and why nations, collectively, remember major events.

“Remember Pearl Harbor” loomed large in American popular memories for more than half a century. During World War II, the phrase helped to silence Americans who had opposed involvement in the war and to galvanize support for a massive war effort. Franklin Roosevelt’s initial “infamy speech” made the attack a central symbol of treachery committed by racial and religious others that needed to be remembered and avenged. The words “Pearl Harbor” came to provide an emotionally powerful answer to why Americans needed to fight. Songs, posters, and bond drives invoked the call to “remember Pearl Harbor.”

After the war, advocates of military preparedness recalled the memory of Pearl Harbor when warning that, in the face of a new Cold War rival, the nation’s defenses needed to be ever-modernized and kept on ready alert. Pearl Harbor increasingly encapsulated a powerful national narrative about how a massive defense establishment and a vast intelligence apparatus were absolutely necessary. Even after the end of the Cold War, warnings about an “electronic Pearl Harbor” that might launch a new kind of cyberwar bolstered the argument for high-tech upgrade of U.S. systems of defense. The words Pearl Harbor thus intimately intertwined with the postwar rise of America’s gargantuan military power and covert capacities.

Remembering Pearl Harbor also became mobilized as a rhetorical resource by those resentful of the postwar rise of Japanese prosperity. Especially during the late 1980s, talk about an “economic Pearl Harbor” echoed through the U.S. media. Business and labor groups alike, predicting America’s decline in face of a new Japanese economic threat, complained about new forms of Japanese treachery—an unfair industrial policy and “free riding” on U.S. defense spending for security in the Pacific. During this era, proposals for various kinds of economic nationalism invoked reminders about Pearl Harbor.

The extensive historical scholarship on the era before World War II suggests that the Pearl Harbor attack offered far more complicated lessons than those circulated in this common public memory of the need for preparedness and greater nationalism. George Kennan’s classic work American Diplomacy positioned Japan’s attack as the culmination of what he regarded as America’s misguided Far Eastern policy, one that tilted moralistically toward China instead of realistically toward Japan. Another classic work, William A. Williams’s Tragedy of American Diplomacy, echoed Charles Beard’s earlier view: Japan’s hostility arose within the context of U.S. economic “open door” expansionism, a policy bound to create resentments and eventually spark U.S. military interventions around the world. Economic historians such as Charles Kindleberger stressed that the Great Depression impoverished nations such as Japan and turned them away from liberal internationalism, even as the United States mounted no serious effort to foster global economic stability. None of these diverse interpretations—and these are only three of many possible examples—saw the Pearl Harbor attack as primarily arising from a lack of American nationalism and military preparedness—in fact, quite the opposite.

In public memories of Pearl Harbor, the complexities in historical scholarship remained nearly invisible. But why do certain narratives about the past become memorable and stay alive while others never catch hold or fall away? Memory researchers point out that prior familiarity shapes both social and personal memory. People generally fit new events into already familiar frames, distorting or forgetting whatever does not fit. “Memory activists” who seek to use history to buttress particular goals, of course, can contribute to molding events so that they will be understood in terms of already familiar, iconic forms.

In its most popularly promoted and remembered form, the Pearl Harbor attack updated verities that had been associated with two other “treacherous” attacks—that at the Alamo and at the Little Bighorn. Familiar stories about these two events, which circulated widely in early twentieth-century American educational and popular media, helped to celebrate America’s special virtues and to justify violent retaliation: America had always been an innocent and a civilization-bringer. Attacks against it (especially successful ones) were irrational and deeply evil. Patriotic Americans would sometimes need to mobilize their full resources and fury against extremist foes that threatened civilization and morality.

Every generation, it seems, updates this powerful narrative of victimhood, evil, and reassurance, making it relevant to its own time and perceived enemy. Japan no longer seems a potential rival, and the World War II generation has mostly slipped away. Memorialization at places such as the Alamo, the Little Bighorn, and Pearl Harbor continue to honor those who died, but these memorials have reached out to new constituencies and developed more protean meanings consistent with international tourist sites. Thus, 9/11 now functions as a more recent, resonant, and unambiguously nationalistic tale of threat and virtue.


Remember WHAT about Pearl Harbor?

Pearl Harbor was a Pacific outpost where our naval vessels and men were left in harm’s way to provide Japan with the target it was looking for, to make an attack President Roosevelt was waiting for. The attack, on the &ldquodate that will live in infamy,&rdquo would provide the United States with overwhelming justification for entering World War II against the Axis powers.

I also know we are supposed to &ldquoRemember the Maine,&rdquo the incident of alleged sabotage that sparked the Spanish-American War that left the United States in possession of Puerto Rico and the Philippines and a permanent naval base in Cuba. But I don’t remember the exact date of that incident that occurred in 1898.

Neither do I remember the date of a 2002 conversation I had with a friend who seemed determined to support the policy of George W. Bush to create a war with Iraq. Our nation was already at war in Afghanistan as a result of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the Bush administration seemed to be saying that war with Iraq was the logical next step. Many had assumed, therefore, that Iraq and that old villain from Central Casting, Saddam Hussein, had something to do with masterminding the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and the aborted planned attack on the White House. There was no evidence to bear that out, but it was hard to hear the facts over the beating of the neocon war drums.

So at some point in that summer of 2002, I asked my good Republican friend why he believed we needed to go to war with Iraq. His answer startled me.

&ldquoBecause I believe my government.&rdquo

Here was an educated man born in 1957. He was, I calculate, not quite in second grade when the Gulf of Tonkin incident took place, so he probably had no more clue as to what really happened in the Tonkin Gulf on that August 1964 night than members of Congress had when they promptly backed President Lyndon Johnson’s bombing raid against Hanoi with the Vietnam Resolution, authorizing the President to take whatever measures necessary to protect American military personnel in South Vietnam, where they were officially functioning as advisors to the South Vietnamese military. The floor leader in the Senate for the nearly unanimous passage of that resolution was J. William Fulbright of Arkansas, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee and later a bitter critic of the U.S. war in Southeast Asia. Only two Senators, both Democrats, voted against the resolution that later was held up as a &ldquofunctional declaration of war.&rdquo They were (drum roll, please) Wayne Morse of Oregon and Ernest Gruening of Alaska. They claimed, and history bore them out, that the administration had not provided evidence of an unprovoked attack on U.S. vessels by the North Vietnamese.

In fact, it would become clear that even President Johnson and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara did not know what happened as they planned and authorized the retaliatory attack. A taped recording of telephone conversations between the two men made plain they were unclear about what actually took place that evening and that their main concern was that the bombing raid be launched in time for the 11 p.m. (Eastern Daylight Time) newscasts.

All of this occurred, as I said, when my friend who trusts his government was somewhere between first and second grade, or possibly between kindergarten and first grade. He had, however, read some history and I specifically recall his telling me that he had read Pulitzer Prize winning journalist David Halberstam’s bestselling book about the Vietnam War, called The Best and the Brightest. Halberstam told the whole story in that book of the bogus attack on the U.S. ships, which were accompanying South Vietnamese vessels making raids on the North Vietnam coast when (or if) they were fired upon. So the North Vietnamese were apparently acting in self-defense, rather than seeking a war with the United States. Yet the fat was in the fire, so to speak. The United States had another &ldquoRemember the Maine&rdquo moment.

And my friend was in high school when the Watergate scandal and its even more scandalous coverup came to light. And revelations about the whitewash by an official government commission of President Kennedy’s assassination. And he might have come across the history of the U.S. spy plane shot down over Soviet territory in 1960. The reconnaissance plane, piloted by Gary Powers, was said to be a weather plane blown off course by the government, the government in which my friend believes, almost religiously. When Secretary Khrushchev was apprised of what was aboard the plane, he expressed mock surprise that CIA Director Allen Dulles had such a deep professional interest in the weather.

All of which suggests that perhaps our government is not all that believable, despite my friend’s abiding trust. And it makes me wonder what has happened to the spirit of American conservatism &mdash that self-consciously conservative/libertarian movement I joined in the Goldwater days of my youth. For my friend is of that Republican conservative persuasion. My mind went back over the decades to the Goldwater Victory Rally in New York’s Madison Square Garden in late October 1964. To be sure, Sen. Barry M. Goldwater, running for President against Democrat Lyndon Johnson, was a hawk on Vietnam and had swallowed the Gulf of Tonkin story as a babe would drink his mother’s milk. But on most matters, it was clear the Goldwater crowd did not think Johnson’s government was to be trusted. We did not &ldquobelieve our government.&rdquo

Goldwater himself, when we finally stopped cheering long enough to let him speak, voiced his contempt for Johnson’s banalities. So did the legendary Clare Boothe Luce, who spurned the pro-Johnson slant of husband Henry Luce’s Time-Life publications, to support Goldwater. The feisty Mrs. Luce was not one to mince words. She had once called the far Left former Secretary of Agriculture and Vice President of the United States Henry Wallace &ldquoStalin’s Mortimer Snerd,&rdquo after ventriloquist Edgar Bergen’s famous puppet of that name. She had also famously said of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt that he &ldquolied us into a war&rdquo into which, she believed, he ought to have honestly and courageously led us.

That Roosevelt, having done his best to provoke an attack by Germany, succeeded in maneuvering Japan into firing the necessary first shot at Pearl Harbor has been abundantly documented. James Perloff, for example, in a 2008 article for The New American, showed conclusively that the December 7 attack that we remember at this time each year was a surprise to our commanders at Pearl Harbor, but not to Roosevelt and his minions in Washington, D.C. (See also Day of Deceit by Robert B. Stinnett, 2008, and Back Door to War by Charles Callan Tansill, 1952.) The verdict has been accepted by historians, including Roosevelt apologists, many of whom contend that such deception was necessary to lead a reluctant nation into a necessary war &mdash what some have called &ldquothe Good War.&rdquo But lie and deceive Roosevelt did, as he plotted to bring us into the war while promising to do his best to keep the nation at peace.

A lot has changed in the intervening 70 years. The United States under President George W. Bush did not attempt to maneuver the government of Saddam Hussein into initiating the attack that would start the Iraq War. Bush could start that war on his own initiative and the American people, like my friend and most members of Congress, supported him in that. Bush, in effect, became the Tojo of the 21st century by striking the first blow, though the war with Iraq was surely no surprise attack, as it had been advertised for roughly a year before the beginning of &ldquoOperation Iraqi Freedom&rdquo and the shock and awe campaign that launched it. But it was either a war of aggression by the United States or that phrase no longer has any meaning.

Much ink has been spilled and paper consumed on America’s &ldquoloss of innocence&rdquo over Pearl Harbor, 9/11, the Kennedy assassination, or some other cataclysmic event. America, the &ldquoexceptional nation,&rdquo lost her innocence in the Garden of Eden, like the rest of sinful humanity. But we have lost much in the way of candor in the last 70 years. For one thing the United States used to call the Department of War by its proper name. Now we call it &ldquoDefense.&rdquo Does anyone really believe that what we have been doing in Iraq is or was a defense of the United States? We now fight wars, as the late columnist Joseph Sobran observed, in the subjunctive, attacking and invading nations for what they might do with weapons they may or may not have. And if Senate Republicans and some Democrats have their way, our government will soon be locking up American citizens on the mere suspicion that they may have been aiding and abetting &ldquoterrorists,&rdquo as terrorism is defined by the government of the United States.

The United States in 1940 and 1941 repeatedly spurned overtures by Japan to reach an agreement on spheres of influence in the Pacific and to negotiate a withdrawal of Japan from most of China and other Asian lands in which she had found herself bogged down in the kind of quagmire that has since become familiar to generations of Americans. The obvious alternative to diplomacy was war. Despite the secrecy of the diplomatic maneuvers aimed at ensuring, rather than preventing, the bringing of war to the United States, government officials left a &ldquopaper trail.&rdquo Secretary of War Henry Stimson noted in his diary on November 25, 1941 the consensus of Roosevelt’s war council: &ldquoThe question was how we should maneuver them into &hellip firing the first shot without allowing too much danger to ourselves.&rdquo It would appear Washington’s covert planners of war underestimated the damage that would be done on the &ldquodate of infamy&rdquo by the naval and aerial forces of Japan, as much of our Pacific fleet was destroyed and more than 2,400 Americans lay dead amidst the flames and wreckage. And like the White House conspirators who managed to bring us into a second war with Iraq in just 12 years, Roosevelt’s war council seriously underestimated the length and cost of the &ldquocake walk&rdquo over our foes in the East.

&ldquoWe can wipe the Japanese off the map in three months,&rdquo wrote Navy Secretary Frank Knox. As Patrick J. Buchanan observes, four years of the most savage and intense fighting in the history of human warfare produced &ldquoscores of thousands of U.S. dead, Hiroshima, Nagasaki, the fall of China to Mao Zedong, U.S. wars in Korea and Vietnam, and the rise of a new arrogant China that shows little respect for the great superpower of yesterday.&rdquo

Former U.S. Senator Rick Santorum of Pennsylvania, now a Republican presidential candidate, told me in a recent campaign appearance in New Hampshire that we need to keep our troops in Germany and Japan 66 years after the end of World War II and 20 years after the breakup of the Soviet Union because Germany and Japan have militaristic cultures and would be dangerous if armed again. I asked what, then, had happened to American culture that necessitated Germany warning us of the dangers of militarism on the eve of our Iraq War. Santorum shrugged.

&ldquoMust be a bunch of damn pacifists over there now,&rdquo I suggested.

&ldquoWell, some of them are,&rdquo he agreed.

The German and Japanese people no doubt believed their respective governments when they said war was forced upon them. The American people did the same when the George W. Bush regime beat the drums for war with Iraq.


Remember Pearl Harbor

It was Sunday and for me at age eight the perspective was based on whatever eight year olds think. I know what I was thinking and if other people had something else on their minds. well, tough apples. On that afternoon, I came home the long way from Tulpehocken Street, one block from our house. Ei! I had found a five dollar bill in the gutter over there on Tulpehocken Street. I hadn't learned about being selfish so I sought out Jimmy Evans and we went on a spending spree at Glickman's store: donuts, candy, soda pop. While not selfish, I wasn't philanthropic. "Halfies?" Não! I didn't offer half of five dollars to Jimmy, and he didn't ask for "halfies." But sixty-five cents spent at Glickman's store that afternoon got us our introduction to gluttony in the alley back of Belfield Avenue within burping distance of Jimmy's house, my house, and Glickman's store.

And on that Sunday afternoon the world exploded. I was eight years old and sat ignorantly by the radio with my family as a commentator told the older ones of the outrage that Japanese planes had done at Pearl Harbor. In houses everywhere families huddled round their radios and for a moment everything else was in suspension.

Mrs. Glickman might have thought that this little kid had stolen the five bucks. Mrs. Glickman probably was distracted for a while by the bad news on the radio. In time, though, she sought out the circumstance of our afternoon excess.

We didn't have a telephone in our house. As a matter of fact, not too many people in our neighborhood did and the occasional need for a phone was satisfied by a short walk to a public telephone booth. Mrs. Glickman, who had a phone, called Mrs. Snoyer, who had a phone, and she walked down to our house that evening to tell my parents about the orgy. They rousted me from my bed. An inquisition followed and they were satisfied that the Tulpehocken Street story was true. Then I was led, by flashlight, into the yard where I retrieved and surrendered the four dollars and thirty-five cents from a flower pot. For me this was the tragedy of the day. I lost a fortune. No doubt it benefited our table, but eight year olds don't want to hear of things like that.

Twenty-six years later, Bill Pira and I were somewhere in Quebec on the way to Montreal. We were having lunch in a little rural village distinguished only by its huge Basilica church. We couldn't get much conversation from the proprietress other than ordering from the menu. She spoke only French we, English. A small boy, perhaps eight years old, came in and loaded up candy, pop, the junk that eight year olds with the resources and undeterred prefer. At the register he produced a twenty dollar bill. My God, there was Mrs. Glickman in French, uninhibited by Pearl Harbor, demanding to know how such a small boy came by twenty dollars. Her questions, though we didn't understand then, were obvious. His answers were probably fuzzy so she asked his name and called his mother. His twenty dollars was good.

We drove on to Montreal and I told Pira of my little boyhood binge. I noted that here (in this little French town) mothers and friends still looked after things that we seemed to have forgotten.

The day when I found five dollars became a day of national consecration. Not so many years are gone and the remembrance has faded away. The old Americans who marked their passage in and out of war were honored through little flags in the windows of their homes: blue stars for each that fought, gold ones for those who died. Those who "remember" are sickened by the lessening of recognition of Pearl Harbor day. It's like everything else doomed to be diminished by time. Pearl's shrine, the USS Arizona, is now a curiosity visited more by Japanese tourists than by American pilgrims.

Time is the great leveller, and to the ever diminishing band of people driven by memories to commemorate once stunning events, it is personally to them incomprehensible that diminished interest has overcome those emotional demonstrations of yore. Kennedy, the fallen idol of a shorter time age, has passed from romantic to the shelf of cold history with Lincoln, Garfield and McKinley. Pearl Harbor will soon run even with "remember the Alamo" and "remember the Maine." The word "remember" moves from command, to plea, to indifference. This is a natural softening of time to heal its wounds.

The lesson about remembering is uneven. In our wars of ascendancy the purpose succeeded and was served by its immediacy. The native Americans, British and Spanish, southerners in our own divided nation, Germans, Italians, Japanese, Koreans, Chinese, Russians, and Vietnamese, all in adversarial position had to and were depicted by then present and future chronicler through propaganda as monsters to raise up our excitement for that purpose. Once resolved, effects diminished as the generations in conflict died away. Antagonisms whose strength outlives the older purposes have darker results: "remember the Boyne," "remember Versailles" have stirred away deserved tranquility.

It's easy for me in 1990 to remember what happened one day in Pearl Harbor in 1941. I found five bucks and it was mine and it was taken away from me and I resented it. Tough apples to those who were ten years older then and had to crawl into fox-holes and work hard to avoid being killed. That's not in the arena of urgencies for eight year olds who are thousands of miles away from the fruits of quarrels.

Some other person might have remembered Pearl Harbor more because of losing five dollars that day. It was a lot of money in hard times.


On November 16, 1941 at the La Dessa U. S. army post in the Philippines, a Japanese aircraft carrier off the coast transmits a coded message to the contraband radio of Nazi spies who stick the message in a bottle of German liquor called Kümmel. The message states a Japanese battleship is approaching Pearl Harbor, Private Steve "Lucky" Smith (Don "Red" Barry) meets his fellow soldiers Bruce Gordon (Alan Curtis) and "Portly" Porter (Maynard Holmes) in the Casa Marina bar, where Lucky and Steve try to attract Portly's sister, Marcia (Fay McKenzie). Portly arranges for Marcia to be the secretary to Andy L. Anderson (Rhys Williams), the owner of the bar. A businessman named Littlefield (Robert Emmett Keane) slips into Marcia's booth to read the message in the Kümmel bottle. Lucky comes to her defence by attacking Littlefield, with Bruce and Portly joining the fight.

Captain Hudson (Ian Keith) orders the soldiers to find the spy's radio. Though Lucky is in charge, he soon returns to the bar to find Marcia. Bruce and Portly, meanwhile, pick up a coded radio transmission from a Japanese boat and follow the beam to Littlefield's hideout. A gunfight erupts where Portly is killed and Littlefield escapes. When Lucky later admits to the captain that he was not there, the captain court-martials him and promotes Bruce to corporal. Lucky escapes from jail and soon after, Anderson, one of the spies, meets with Van Hoorten (Sig Ruman), another Nazi posing as a Dutch Indian. They discuss a plan to stockpile ammunition and gas for the Japanese troops who will invade.

Anderson is to kill Littlefield and arrange for the gas to be transported to their warehouse, but when Lucky turns to Anderson for help, Anderson slyly tips him off to Littlefield's hideout. That night, Lucky attacks Littlefield but Anderson shoots him, then gives Lucky the job of transporting some "crude oil" to his warehouse.

On the way, Bruce stops Lucky's truck and asks him to turn himself in. At the warehouse, Lucky realizes that his cargo is gasoline. Marcia and Lucky sneak into Van Hoorten's office that night and find ammunition and a Nazi flag. Van Hoorten bursts in and Lucky shoots him.

Bruce, who has tracked Lucky to the warehouse, hears a radio announcement that Pearl Harbor has been bombed. Before the three can leave, Japanese aircraft land nearby and the soldiers enter the office with Anderson. The three Americans escape, find a radio and send Captain Hudson a message for help.

When the American troops arrive, Hudson spots another Japanese aircraft carrier in the bay. Lucky courageously saves the Americans by flying a Japanese aircraft into the carrier in a suicide mission. Bruce receives a Distinguished Service Cross while Marcia collects the award on Lucky's behalf.

    as Pvt. Steve "Lucky" Smith as Bruce Gordon as Marcia Porter as Dirk Van Hoorten as Capt. Hudson as Señor "Andy" Anderson
  • Maynard Holmes as Pvt. "Portly" Porter
  • Diana Del Rio as Doralda as Mr. Littlefield
  • Sammy Stein as MP Sgt. Adams
  • Paul Fung as Japanese Bartender
  • James B. Leong as Japanese Major

Principal photography on Remember Pearl Harbor, took place from March 12 to April 6, 1942. [5]

Reviewer Herbert Cohn of the Brooklyn Daily Eagle wrote:

"Remember Pearl Harbor" underneath its title, is a phony. It isn't about Pearl Harbor at all. . [It is] about fifth columnists in the Philippines, a few thousand miles west of Pearl Harbor. And it isn't even a good picture about fifth columnists. It is pokey, except when the Japanese arrive toward the end and the army garrison at Manilla comes to life to be trapped by them. [6]

Bosley Crowther in his review of Remember Pearl Harbor para O jornal New York Times, despaired,"Pearl Harbor is something to remember, but Republic's 'Remember Pearl Harbor' definitely is not. For this cheap little action drama, which popped into Loew's Criterion yesterday, has nothing to recommend it save its title, nothing in the way of a story that isn't old. ." [7]


Remember 9/11, Forget Pearl Harbor?

Emily S. Rosenberg is professor of history at the University of California, Irvine, past president of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations, and author of "A Date Which Will Live: Pearl Harbor in American Memory" (Durham: Duke University Press, 2003). This article is cross-posted from a roundtable on SHAFR's blog.

Is 12/7 or 9/11 the date that lives in infamy? The possibility that popular historical memories of the attack of 9/11 may be crowding out those of the Japan’s 1941 attack, making 9/11 the central infamous episode in recent U.S. history, raises larger questions about how and why nations, collectively, remember major events.

“Remember Pearl Harbor” loomed large in American popular memories for more than half a century. During World War II, the phrase helped to silence Americans who had opposed involvement in the war and to galvanize support for a massive war effort. Franklin Roosevelt’s initial “infamy speech” made the attack a central symbol of treachery committed by racial and religious others that needed to be remembered and avenged. The words “Pearl Harbor” came to provide an emotionally powerful answer to why Americans needed to fight. Songs, posters, and bond drives invoked the call to “remember Pearl Harbor.”

After the war, advocates of military preparedness recalled the memory of Pearl Harbor when warning that, in the face of a new Cold War rival, the nation’s defenses needed to be ever-modernized and kept on ready alert. Pearl Harbor increasingly encapsulated a powerful national narrative about how a massive defense establishment and a vast intelligence apparatus were absolutely necessary. Even after the end of the Cold War, warnings about an “electronic Pearl Harbor” that might launch a new kind of cyberwar bolstered the argument for high-tech upgrade of U.S. systems of defense. The words Pearl Harbor thus intimately intertwined with the postwar rise of America’s gargantuan military power and covert capacities.

Remembering Pearl Harbor also became mobilized as a rhetorical resource by those resentful of the postwar rise of Japanese prosperity. Especially during the late 1980s, talk about an “economic Pearl Harbor” echoed through the U.S. media. Business and labor groups alike, predicting America’s decline in face of a new Japanese economic threat, complained about new forms of Japanese treachery—an unfair industrial policy and “free riding” on U.S. defense spending for security in the Pacific. During this era, proposals for various kinds of economic nationalism invoked reminders about Pearl Harbor.

The extensive historical scholarship on the era before World War II suggests that the Pearl Harbor attack offered far more complicated lessons than those circulated in this common public memory of the need for preparedness and greater nationalism. George Kennan’s classic work American Diplomacy positioned Japan’s attack as the culmination of what he regarded as America’s misguided Far Eastern policy, one that tilted moralistically toward China instead of realistically toward Japan. Another classic work, William A. Williams’s Tragedy of American Diplomacy, echoed Charles Beard’s earlier view: Japan’s hostility arose within the context of U.S. economic “open door” expansionism, a policy bound to create resentments and eventually spark U.S. military interventions around the world. Economic historians such as Charles Kindleberger stressed that the Great Depression impoverished nations such as Japan and turned them away from liberal internationalism, even as the United States mounted no serious effort to foster global economic stability. None of these diverse interpretations—and these are only three of many possible examples—saw the Pearl Harbor attack as primarily arising from a lack of American nationalism and military preparedness—in fact, quite the opposite.

In public memories of Pearl Harbor, the complexities in historical scholarship remained nearly invisible. But why do certain narratives about the past become memorable and stay alive while others never catch hold or fall away? Memory researchers point out that prior familiarity shapes both social and personal memory. People generally fit new events into already familiar frames, distorting or forgetting whatever does not fit. “Memory activists” who seek to use history to buttress particular goals, of course, can contribute to molding events so that they will be understood in terms of already familiar, iconic forms.

In its most popularly promoted and remembered form, the Pearl Harbor attack updated verities that had been associated with two other “treacherous” attacks—that at the Alamo and at the Little Bighorn. Familiar stories about these two events, which circulated widely in early twentieth-century American educational and popular media, helped to celebrate America’s special virtues and to justify violent retaliation: America had always been an innocent and a civilization-bringer. Attacks against it (especially successful ones) were irrational and deeply evil. Patriotic Americans would sometimes need to mobilize their full resources and fury against extremist foes that threatened civilization and morality.

Every generation, it seems, updates this powerful narrative of victimhood, evil, and reassurance, making it relevant to its own time and perceived enemy. Japan no longer seems a potential rival, and the World War II generation has mostly slipped away. Memorialization at places such as the Alamo, the Little Bighorn, and Pearl Harbor continue to honor those who died, but these memorials have reached out to new constituencies and developed more protean meanings consistent with international tourist sites. Thus, 9/11 now functions as a more recent, resonant, and unambiguously nationalistic tale of threat and virtue.


More Comments:

Dominic W. Moreo - 9/13/2002

Intern, indeed. If dealing with a morning paper like the NYT, one must consult the following day, say, December 8, 1942, to find out what happened on December 7th. But today growing up in instant 24/7 cycles, it is difficult to understand the snail like pace of the press.
So FDR attributed the "arsenal of democracy" to John Milton late of the 17th Century! And our intern bought it! But FDR got it from . who got it from. the originator. Check it out.

Yumitsu Takaishi - 9/13/2002

I understand that America has to fight against terrorizm in order to protect America itself.I also agree with your hostility to terrorists,but do not acccept your behavior in Afganistan.
Japanese army attacked Pearl Harver in December 1941.That hurt the pride of American nations."Remember Pearl Harver."has chenged to"Remember 9.11." you are going to do the same thing you had done in world war 2. You must not forget you had burned eighty thousand citizen people to death only through two hours bombing attack at Tokyo by 240 B29 on March 10 1945.Do you repeat that tragedy again? Do you want to make your country insane by bearing huge number of murders in your own country?
Do you believe that America is quarified to blame Iraq, North Corea and Iran for their dangerouseness? As far as I am concerned,America can not solve the troubles we are fronting now by uaing military power. It surely will make another troubles one after another. Você não acha que deveria escolher outra forma mais inteligente de ser respeitado por todos no mundo todo?


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